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2369 — Superadmin redirected away from non-member units (guard authorized client-side)

Context

A global-scope user (e.g. superadmin) opening /{lang}/{unitId}-{slug}/{year}/… for a unit they hold no UnitUser membership row in was silently redirected to the landing resolver.

Two layers on the authorization path:

  1. validateUnit() (frontend/src/router/guards/validateUnitGuard.ts) only accepted units present in workspaceStore.units, populated from GET /api/v1/users/units — a client-side authorization decision, violating the invariant "the frontend never checks roles; the backend decides" (guardrails).
  2. UnitService.get_user_units inner-joins UnitUser on user_id, so the list is membership-scoped regardless of role — a superadmin never receives units they aren't members of.

Fix (frontend-only, backend stays the decision-maker)

  • frontend/src/utils/resolveWorkspaceUnit.ts (new): pure leaf helper. Membership list is a fast path; any other parsable unit id is resolved by asking the backend. Kept free of store/api imports so the regression test runs node-side under Playwright (repo has no Vitest).
  • frontend/src/router/guards/validateUnitGuard.ts: validateUnit() now calls the helper, passing a fetchUnit backed by workspaceStore.getUnit(id) → GET /api/v1/units/{id}, which runs policy authorization server-side (UnitService.get_by_id → query_policy("authz/resource/read")). 200 → setUnit() and proceed; 403/404 → the existing workspace-setup redirect.
  • frontend/src/stores/workspace.ts: getUnit (sole caller is this guard flow) passes skipErrorCodes: [403, 404] — refusal is an expected outcome handled by the guard, not a toast.
  • frontend/src/api/http.ts: the global 403 hook (toast + hard location.replace('/unauthorized')) now honors skipErrorCodes like the generic error branch already did, so a caller that declared 403 expected gets the HTTPError instead of a hard redirect. No existing caller passed 403, so behavior is unchanged elsewhere.

Rest of the flow (verified, no change needed)

After the guard passes, the workspace loads GET /carbon-reports/unit/{id}/year/{y}/ (create on 404) and GET /carbon-reports/{id}/modules/. All of these enforce require_unit_access (backend/app/core/policy.py), which explicitly allows global-scope roles — so a superadmin's workspace on a non-member unit loads end to end. No backend change shipped.

Regression test

frontend/tests/unit/validate-unit-resolution.spec.ts (Playwright unit suite, npm run test-ct): pins that a member unit resolves without a backend call, that a non-member unit allowed by the backend resolves (the reported bug — resolved to null/redirect before the fix), that a backend refusal still redirects, and that an unparsable unit param never reaches the backend.

Parked follow-ups (permission scoping — waits for the lead)

  • authz/resource/read in backend/app/core/policy.py is still the legacy allow-all stub, so GET /units/{id} returns 200 for any authenticated user. The guard therefore currently admits any user to the URL, and the first workspace data call (require_unit_access) 403s non-members — visible refusal via the global 403 handling, not a silent wrong page. Implementing a real read policy (global scope or unit-scoped role) will make the guard's 403 → workspace-setup redirect path active. Do not widen or tighten this while the lead is away.
  • Latent, pre-existing: the guard's GET users/units call uses the default limit=100; a user with >100 visible units would previously have been redirected for units past the cap. The backend probe added here masks the user-facing symptom (the unit now resolves via GET /units/{id}), but the membership list itself is still truncated for such users (e.g. in the workspace selector).