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Planner: mirror PlanPolicy in the delete gate

Follow-up to the permissions review in #2607, on top of #2043.

Problem

The delete button in CO2ProjectPlanner.vue gates on canDeletePlan, a frontend mirror of the backend PlanPolicy.can_delete. The two had drifted in shape, in a way no current role exercises but nothing prevents:

  1. canDeletePlan accepted any delete grant, at any breadth. A planner.plans/<cf>: [delete] key made it return true for every visible plan, including a colleague's shared one, while PlanPolicy.can_delete short-circuits on global breadth only and otherwise falls back to created_by == user_id → an enabled button and a 403. The branch is dead today (principals hold delete at /own), so this was latent: the first role to gain unit-breadth delete would have surfaced it as a bug report.
  2. The permission payload goes stale within a session. bootstrap() snapshots user.permissions at login while the backend recomputes them from roles_raw on every request. An ACCRED role change or a role_sync_service run mid-session leaves the SPA gating affordances on the old keys until a hard reload; for the planner that means an enabled delete button whose call PlanPolicy.for_unit refuses with 403 "Access to this unit is not permitted." This one is live, and not planner-specific — the planner is just where it surfaces as a hard 403 rather than a shorter list.

Compounding both: plan 2043's Tests section listed frontend/tests/unit/planner-delete-permission.spec.ts, but the file was never committed. canDeletePlan had no test coverage at all, which is why (1) went unnoticed.

Decision

No product-rule change and no backend rule change. Deletion stays creator-only below global breadth — that is the deliberate #1930 / #2043 rule ("principals get delete at own breadth on purpose so a principal still cannot delete a colleague's plan"). The fix is to make the frontend mirror structurally correct, and to stop the snapshot ageing.

Changes

canDeletePlan resolves the breadth first

frontend/src/utils/permission.ts gains a private resolvePlanBreadth mirroring the backend resolve_module_scope (bare > /<cf> > /<cf>/own > denied). canDeletePlan then applies PlanPolicy.can_delete's rule: global deletes anything, any other breadth is creator-only, null denies.

Behaviour is identical for every role emitted today. What changes is what happens next time a role changes: a future unit-breadth delete key degrades to creator-only on both sides, instead of over-permitting on one.

The home aggregate carries fresh permissions

WorkspaceHomeResponse gains permissions: dict, filled from PlanPolicy.permissions — the policy the route already builds computes current_user.calculate_permissions(), so the value is free and no second computation or query is added. workspaceGuard fans it into the auth store via a new setPermissions action, next to the setPlans / setConfig / setModuleStates fan-out it already does.

This rides the aggregate call the guard makes on every run, so no XHR is added and the page budget is untouched. It is the same reasoning already applied to configuredYears for #1558: a value a backoffice admin can flip mid-session cannot be cached once per bootstrap.

The complementary half was already handled: when a role change removes unit access outright, the home call itself 403s and the guard's workspace-refused path clears the workspace and redirects.

What is deliberately not changed

  • PlanPolicy.can_delete does not learn unit breadth. Granting a role unit-wide deletion is a product decision, not a refactor; if it is ever wanted, the backend is the place to change and the frontend now follows.
  • The button stays rendered-but-disabled. The gate is UX only; the backend DELETE remains the authority, and a direct API call still gets the real answer.
  • A plan deleted concurrently, or one that stopped being shared, keeps answering 404 rather than 403 — require() checks can_view first so plan ids do not leak.

Tests

  • frontend/tests/unit/planner-delete-permission.spec.ts (new, the file 2043 promised): global breadth; own breadth creator / non-creator; the real principal key pair; unit breadth with delete, non-creator → false (the regression, red before this change); no key; no unit context; no user id.
  • backend/tests/unit/v1/test_workspace_home.py::test_payload_carries_freshly_computed_permissions: the payload carries calculate_permissions() for the caller's roles.
  • Plan 2043's Tests section corrected to point at the file that now exists.